Operating systems have global directories where any user has write access. Those folders are mostly used as temporary storage areas like
/tmp
in Linux based systems. An application manipulating files from these folders is exposed to race conditions on filenames: a malicious
user can try to create a file with a predictable name before the application does. A successful attack can result in other files being accessed,
modified, corrupted or deleted. This risk is even higher if the application runs with elevated permissions.
In the past, it has led to the following vulnerabilities:
This rule raises an issue whenever it detects a hard-coded path to a publicly writable directory like /tmp
(see examples bellow). It
also detects access to environment variables that point to publicly writable directories, e.g., TMP
and TMPDIR
.
/tmp
/var/tmp
/usr/tmp
/dev/shm
/dev/mqueue
/run/lock
/var/run/lock
/Library/Caches
/Users/Shared
/private/tmp
/private/var/tmp
\Windows\Temp
\Temp
\TMP
There is a risk if you answered yes to any of those questions.
new File("/tmp/myfile.txt"); // Sensitive Paths.get("/tmp/myfile.txt"); // Sensitive java.io.File.createTempFile("prefix", "suffix"); // Sensitive, will be in the default temporary-file directory. java.nio.file.Files.createTempDirectory("prefix"); // Sensitive, will be in the default temporary-file directory.
Map<String, String> env = System.getenv(); env.get("TMP"); // Sensitive
new File("/myDirectory/myfile.txt"); // Compliant File.createTempFile("prefix", "suffix", new File("/mySecureDirectory")); // Compliant if(SystemUtils.IS_OS_UNIX) { FileAttribute<Set<PosixFilePermission>> attr = PosixFilePermissions.asFileAttribute(PosixFilePermissions.fromString("rwx------")); Files.createTempFile("prefix", "suffix", attr); // Compliant } else { File f = Files.createTempFile("prefix", "suffix").toFile(); // Compliant f.setReadable(true, true); f.setWritable(true, true); f.setExecutable(true, true); }