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Privilege Escalation (TA0004)
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Carbanak+FIN7 |
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Step | ATT&CK Pattern |
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4.B.5
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15.A.5
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17.A.4
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Technique Hijack Execution Flow (T1574) Subtechnique Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking (T1574.001) |
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Criteria
fodhelper.exe spawns cmd.exe as a high-integrity process (note: Due to the configuration of the environment, the adversary's process was high by default. This sub-step was evaluated based on the criteria of detecting data related to process integrity level as well as the executed mechanics of the UAC bypass)
Data Sources
- Process Monitoring


Criteria
fodhelper.exe spawns cmd.exe as a high-integrity process (note: Due to the configuration of the environment, the adversary's process was high by default. This sub-step was evaluated based on the criteria of detecting data related to process integrity level as well as the executed mechanics of the UAC bypass)
Data Sources
- Windows Registry


Criteria
powershell.exe spawns samcat.exe as a high-integrity process (note: Due to the configuration of the environment, the adversary's process was high by default. This sub-step was evaluated based on the criteria of detecting data related to process integrity level as well as the executed mechanics of the UAC bypass)
Data Sources
- Process Monitoring


Criteria
powershell.exe spawns samcat.exe as a high-integrity process (note: Due to the configuration of the environment, the adversary's process was high by default. This sub-step was evaluated based on the criteria of detecting data related to process integrity level as well as the executed mechanics of the UAC bypass)
Data Sources
- Windows Registry


Criteria
powershell.exe spawns samcat.exe as a high-integrity process (note: Due to the configuration of the environment, the adversary's process was high by default. This sub-step was evaluated based on the criteria of detecting data related to process integrity level as well as the executed mechanics of the UAC bypass)
Data Sources
- Process Monitoring
- Windows Registry


APT29 |
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Step | ATT&CK Pattern |
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3.B.1
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3.B.2
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14.A.1
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14.A.2
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Procedure
Modified the Registry to enable COM hijacking of sdclt.exe using PowerShell
Criteria
Addition of the DelegateExecute subkey in HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command
Footnotes
- The logic used to produce this detection was configured after the start of the evaluation, so it is identified as a Detection Configuration Change.

